翻訳と辞書
Words near each other
・ Coeranoscincus
・ Coeranus
・ Coeranus (mythology)
・ Coeranus of Beroea
・ Coeratadas
・ Coerce (band)
・ Coerced abstinence
・ Coerced Existence
・ Coercion
・ Coercion (band)
・ Coercion (disambiguation)
・ Coercion (linguistics)
・ Coercion Act
・ Coercive citation
・ Coercive deficiency
Coercive diplomacy
・ Coercive function
・ Coercive isomorphism
・ Coercive monopoly
・ Coercivity
・ Coeriana
・ Coerney
・ Coeroeni
・ Coeroeni River
・ Coeroenie Airstrip
・ Coert Beerman
・ Coert Cronjé
・ Coert Steynberg
・ Coert Van Voorhees
・ Coeruleotaygetis


Dictionary Lists
翻訳と辞書 辞書検索 [ 開発暫定版 ]
スポンサード リンク

Coercive diplomacy : ウィキペディア英語版
Coercive diplomacy
Coercive diplomacy or "''forceful persuasion''" is the "attempt to get a target, a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a nonstate actor-to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force."〔Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, ''The United States and Coercive Diplomacy'' United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC 2003〕 This term also refers to "diplomacy presupposing the use or threatened use of military force to achieve political objectives."〔Carnes Lord, "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy," with comments by Paul A. Smith, Jr., and Richard G. Stilwell, in Barnett and Lord, eds., ''Political Warfare and Psychological Operations'' (National Defense University Press, 1989)〕 Coercive diplomacy "is essentially a diplomatic strategy, one that relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force. If force must be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion, it is employed in an exemplary manner, in the form of quite limited military action, to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary."〔Major Lisa A. Nemeth. ("The Use of Pauses in Coercion: An Explanation in Theory" )〕
Coercive diplomacy can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary’s will or incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation."〔Jack S. Levy. ("Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George" )〕
As distinguished from deterrence theory, which is a strategy aimed at adversaries to dissuade them from undertaking an action not yet started, coercive diplomacy entails efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action.〔George, Alexander and William Simons. ''The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy'', 2nd Rev. ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994〕 Its central task is "to create in the opponent the expectation of costs of sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue what he is doing."〔George, Alexander. ''Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War.'' Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1991 〕 ''Coercive diplomacy'' attempts to have force be a much more "flexible, refined psychological instrument of policy in contrast to the 'quick, decisive' military strategy, which uses force as a blunt instrument."〔
==Background==

The term 'coercive diplomacy' falls under the theory of coercion as a foreign policy tool. In their book ''The Dynamics of Coercion-American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might'', Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define coercive diplomacy as "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it." Coercion strategy "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary’s decision making but may also include limited uses of actual force."〔Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. ''The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might'' New York. Cambridge University Press. 2002.〕 Joseph Nye emphasizes that coercive diplomacy depends upon the credibility and the cost of the threat. "If a threat is not credible, it may fail to produce acceptance ''and'' it may lead to costs to the reputation of the coercing state. In general, threats are costly when they fail, not only in encouraging resistance in the target, but also in negatively influencing third parties observing the outcome."〔
A strategy commonly associated with coercion theory and coercive diplomacy is the concept of deterrence, or "the maintenance of military power for the purpose of discouraging attack."〔()〕 The term ''deterrence'' is differentiated from coercive diplomacy. In his influential work, ''Arms and Influence'', Thomas Schelling puts forth a general concept of ''coercion theory'' as it emerges beyond deterrence. According to Schelling, deterrence is merely a passive threat aimed at keeping an adversary from acting. It is only a threat. "Initiative is placed on the opponent to take the first action triggering a response from the coercer." Schelling believes that deterrence does not present "a comprehensive picture of coercion, leading Schelling to introduce the concept of compellence."〔
'Compellence', in contrast to 'deterrence', shifts the initiative for the first action to the coercer. While deterrence means waiting passively in hope of not seeing a response, compellence is active, thereby, "inducing his withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action that threatens to hurt."〔
When differentiating between deterrence and compellence, deterrence can be described as "drawing a line in the sand" and acting only if the adversary crosses it; in contrast, compellence "requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts" as in deterrence. "Coercion composed of both compellence and deterrence is about action and inaction."〔
Alexander L. George, a scholar of international relations and former professor of political science at Stanford University, was a pioneer in the field of political psychology.〔http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2006/august23/obitgeorge-082306.html〕 Like Schelling before him, Alexander George worked to create a diplomatic strategy of coercion; his was the theory of ''coercive diplomacy''. Unlike Schelling, George's theory of 'coercive diplomacy' is different than Schelling's 'coercive warfare', in that he believed that coercive diplomacy was "a subset of coercion and compellence." He viewed it as encompassing "defensive" compellent actions only: to force a target to stop or reverse action already taken, rather than an offensive goal of forcing them to do something ... Coercive diplomacy essentially is the embodiment of a "carrot and stick" philosophy: motivation is used to induce a target to submit to your wishes, while appearing threatening at the same time."〔

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
ウィキペディアで「Coercive diplomacy」の詳細全文を読む



スポンサード リンク
翻訳と辞書 : 翻訳のためのインターネットリソース

Copyright(C) kotoba.ne.jp 1997-2016. All Rights Reserved.